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Procrastination  is  an  almost  archetypal  phenomenon  of  human  behaviour,  the 
nature and prevalence of which may have severe implications for the foundations 
of Microeconomic theory and the rational actor model.  This paper aims to assess 
why  and  how  agents  procrastinate  in  theory  and  what  the  implications  of 
procrastination may be.  It is argued that procrastination is a rational response to 
present-biased  preferences  and  that  the  extent  of  procrastination,  and  the 
subsequent  welfare  implications  thereof,  depends  on  the  degree  of 
conscientiousness regarding one’s own expected future self-control problems and 
the  nature  and  requirements  of  the  task  with  which  one  is  assigned.    The 
theoretical  model  proposed  to  analyse  procrastination  therefore  parameterises 
the  temporal  evolution  of  present-biased  preferences  as  a  function  of  agents’ 
levels of  conscientiousness.   It  is found  that  less  conscientious  agents tend  to 
procrastinate more than more conscientious agents, that uncertainty exacerbates 
the  extent  and  compounds  the  implications  of  procrastinating  behaviour,  and, 
consequently,  that  procrastination  is  more  likely  to  be  welfare  non-maximising 
the lower an agent’s level of  conscientiousness and the greater the  amount of 
uncertainty that exists regarding the nature and requirements of the task with 
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 “Do not put your work off till tomorrow and the day after; for a sluggish worker does not fill his 
barn, nor one who puts off his work: industry makes work go well, but a man who puts off work is 
always at hand-grips with ruin.” 
- The Greek didactic poet Hesiod in ‘Works and Days’ (~800 BC) 
1. Introduction 
Procrastination  is  an  almost  archetypal  phenomenon  of  human  behaviour  that  has 
manifested  in  various  endeavours  of  life  for  millennia  (Steel,  2007:67).    Despite  its 
pervasiveness, however, surprisingly little attention has been given to the causes and 
consequences of procrastination in the economic literature.  Yet, if the psychological 
literature  is  to  be  believed, the  prevalence  of procrastination  may  well have  severe 
implications for the very foundations of Microeconomic theory; not least for the rational 
actor model (Akerlof, 1991:2).  For this reason, it is necessary to carefully consider 
whether  the  act  of  procrastination  can  be  explained  by,  or  reconciled  with,  time-
consistent preferences and what the potential consequences of procrastination are for 
individual welfare. 
The aim of this paper is to assess the theoretical welfare implications of procrastination 
on  a  multi-period  divisible  task  in  which  the  costs  of  performing  the  task  are 
experienced immediately whilst the reward from the task, the size of which depends 
directly on the amount of effort put into its performance, is only obtained after the task 
has been completed.  It is argued that procrastination is a rational response to present-
biased preferences and that the extent of procrastination, and the subsequent welfare 
implications thereof, depends on the degree of conscientiousness regarding one’s own 
expected future self-control problems and the nature and requirements of the task with 
which  one  is  assigned.    In  accordance  with  the  behavioural  literature  on 
procrastination,  the  use  of  the  terms  conscientiousness,  naivety,  and  sophistication 
throughout this paper therefore refer to (a) the extent to which agents are aware that 
they will face self-control problems w.r.t. their future performance of tasks and (b) the 
extent to which they are aware of the nature and requirements of these tasks.  The 
model  proposed  to  analyse  procrastination  departs  from  previous  models  by 
parameterising the temporal evolution of present-biased preferences as a function of 4 
 
 
agents’ levels of conscientiousness.1  This feature allows one to gauge, for different levels 
of conscientiousness, the extent to which procrastination may cause an agent to under-
perform vis-à-vis personal, predetermined goals and subsequently suffer any losses to 
personal welfare. 
Employing the new model of procrastination, the results from the illustrative examples 
of procrastinating behaviour in this paper show that less conscientious (i.e. more naive) 
agents  tend  to  procrastinate  more  severely  than  more  conscientious  (i.e.  more 
sophisticated)  agents.    This  result  is  compounded  by  the  degree  of  uncertainty  that 
exists  regarding  the  nature  and  requirements  of  the  task  with  which  the  agent  is 
assigned.  As a result, the procrastinating behaviour of more naive agents is likely to be 
welfare  non-maximising.    By  contrast,  more  sophisticated  agents  may  be  able  to 
maximise their personal subjective welfare even when they do procrastinate.  
The paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 provides an overview of  the literature on 
some  of  the  key  concepts  related  to  procrastination,  including  the  relevance  of 
procrastination to field of economics and the extent to which procrastinating behaviour 
can be reconciled with rational behaviour.  Section 3 discusses the traditional approach 
to modelling procrastination and reviews some of the previous models of intertemporal 
preferences that have been used to investigate procrastination.  Section 4 presents the 
development of the new intertemporal preference model that may be used to assess the 
welfare  implications  of  procrastinating  behaviour.    Section  5  employs  the  model 
developed  in  Section  4  to  analyse  procrastinating  behaviour  in  two  illustrative 
examples.  Finally, Section 6 comments on some of the issues related to procrastination 




                                                           
 
1 The  foundations  of  this  model  are  predicated  on  former  models  of  procrastination  put  forth  by 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001 and 2006) and Fischer (1999 and 2001). 5 
 
 
2. The Literature on Procrastination: Key Issues To Consider 
2.1.  Defining Procrastination 
To analyze the causes and consequences of procrastinating behaviour, it is necessary to 
first  understand  precisely  what  procrastination  entails.    However,  because  the 
parameters  that  influence  procrastination  may  vary  between  settings,  a  number  of 
different  definitions  have  been  formulated  in  the  psychological  and  economic 
literature.2   
Some  authors argue that, i n certain instances,  procrastination  may potentially have 
beneficial consequences.  This would be the case , for instance, if the postponement of 
certain actions, the outcomes of which are uncertain,  forces an agent to accumulate 
more information and gain more certainty before taking action  (Bernstein, 1998:15).  
However,  in  general,  procrastination  is  described  as  behaviour   with  negative 
implications.  Steel (2007:66) defines procrastination as the  “...voluntarily delay of an 
intended course of  action despite expecting to be  worse off for the delay.”    Similarly, 
Solomon  and  Rothblum  (1984:503)  define  procrastination  as  the  “...act of needlessly 
delaying tasks to the point of experiencing subjective discomfort.” Again, Akerlof (1991:1) 
describes  procrastination  as  a  pathological  behaviour  of  task  deferment,  the 
consequences of which individuals do not fully appreciate at the point where deferment 
occurs. 
Despite  minor  differences,  most  definitions  of  procrastination  in  the  psychological 
literature  emphasise three distinct  elements  (Schraw, Wadkins &  Olafson, 2007:12). 
Firstly,  procrastination  involves  the  delay  of  a  certain  intended  course  of  action. 
Secondly,  the  delay  of  this  action  is  needless.    Thirdly,  this  needless  delay  is 
counterproductive and, as such, leads to a loss of personal welfare.  Accepting the first 
and second statements regarding procrastination, the primary aim of this paper is to 
assess whether, in theory, procrastination necessarily leads to a loss of personal welfare 
                                                           
 
2 Consider, for example, a 40 year-old man who defers making personal contributions to his own pension 
and  a  20-year  old  student  who  postpones  studying  for  her  exams.    While  the  behaviour  of  both 
individuals  may  be  characterised  as  procrastination,  the  underlying  factors  that  inform  their 
procrastinating  behaviour  are  unlikely  to  be  precisely  the  same.    By  extension,  the  extent  and 
consequences of their respective procrastinating behaviours may differ.     6 
 
 
or whether, under certain circumstances, it is possible for an  agent to procrastinate 
without losing subjective utility.   
2.2.  The Relevance, Prevalence and Pervasiveness of Procrastination 
Procrastination  is  a  particularly  common  phenomenon  in  academia.    In  a  study 
conducted by Solomon and Rothblum (1984:505), it is found that at least 46% of college 
students consider themselves serious procrastinators.  Other studies have found that 
between 80% and 95% of college students regularly procrastinate when performing 
academic tasks (Steel, 2007:65).   However, the manifestations of procrastination are 
not only prevalent in academia, but are also pervasive in other areas.  For example, 
smokers wishing to give up the habit procrastinate when they claim that their current 
cigarette will be their last, only to make the same claim again when they light up their 
next cigarette.   Similarly, people postpone taking out the garbage, put off returning 
important phone calls, delay purchasing certain goods and services, and defer many 
other actions because they anticipate the performance thereof to be unpleasant and/or 
because  they  believe  that  the  cost  of  deferment  will  be  negligible,  especially  if 
performance of the task does not seem to be particularly urgent at the specific juncture. 
While the types of procrastination described above are commonplace, they do not, at 
first glance, appear to be particularly relevant to the field of economics.  However, when 
people delay saving for their old-age they increase their dependency on state-provided 
pensions – a dependency which, ultimately, will most likely be funded by tax-payers.  
Similarly,  if  the  largest  producer  of  electricity  in  a  country  defers  for  years  the 
maintenance of its power-plants and the expansion of its capacity to provide electricity, 
that  country’s  entire  economy  may,  many  years  later,  suffer  severely  as  a  result  of 
widespread  rolling  blackouts.    In  these  examples,  the  economic  implications  of 
procrastination are clear: not only may deferment of certain tasks result in a loss of 
personal welfare for the procrastinating agent(s), but it may also materially affect social 
welfare.    
Procrastination may also be relevant to the field of economics in a more insidious way.  
Specifically,  if  it  is  found  that  procrastination  violates  the  economic  assumption  of 
rationality,  its  pervasiveness  may  undermine  the  most  essential  underpinnings  of 7 
 
 
microeconomic theory.   As discussed in the following section, this may very well be the 
case. 
2.3.  Procrastination and Rationality 
From  a  psychological  perspective,  procrastination  is  caused  by  a  combination  of 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors that incentivise the unnecessary delay of tasks which are 
regarded as aversive in some way (Ross, 2009:2).3  In general, this aversiveness stems 
from the fact that performance of the task requires  the input of  effort and/or time.  
However, while task aversiveness may be an important correlate of procrastination, it 
alone  cannot  explain  why  procrastination  occurs.    After  all,  if  one  accepts  that 
individuals have time-consistent preferences, as microeconomic theory suggests,  then 
an agent’s aversion to the performance of a task today will be the same as her expected 
aversion  to  the  performance  of  the  task  tomorrow  and  indeed  the  day  thereafter 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999:103).  In this context, task aversion in itself can therefore 
only explain whether or not an individual is inclined to perform a task at all. 
Akerlof  (1991:1)  purports  that  procrastination  occurs  because  present  costs  and 
rewards  have  undue  salience  relative  to  future  costs  and  rewards.  That  is,  people 
perceive the present costs and/or rewards of performing an action more vividly than 
the future cost and/or rewards.4  However, this salience can only be classified as undue 
if a priori  judgements regarding the  magnitude  of current  costs/rewards  relative  to 
future costs/rewards are revealed to be incorrect ex post.  Therefore, it would be more 
prudent to refer to Akerlof’s argument as one of differential, rather than undue, salience. 
Given  this  differential  salience,  task  aversion  becomes  a  plausible  partial  cause  of 
procrastination.   An agent may be more averse to performing a task today than in the 
future if the costs of performing the task today are perceived more vividly than the costs 
of performing the very same task in the future.  Expecting that future costs will be less 
than today’s, the agent has an incentive to postpone the performance of the task until a 
                                                           
 
3 According to Steel (2007: 67), personality traits (including an individual’s conscientiousness regarding 
his/her  own  self-control  problems)  and  task  characteristics  (including  the  timing  and  structure  of 





later  time.    However,  when  that  time  arrives,  the  agent  faces  exactly  the  same 
differential salience problem and once again has an incentive to postpone the task to an 
even later time. 
Two important points flow from this description of salience–induced procrastination.  
Firstly,  procrastination  constitutes  a  self-control  problem  (Ariely  and  Wertenbroch, 
2002:219). On the first day, the agent makes an implicit commitment to perform the 
task later, only to abandon this commitment when that later time comes.  The agent 
thus experiences an intertemporal preference reversal: initially she prefers to perform 
the task at a later time, but when that time arrives she again prefers to perform the task 
not then, but later.  Secondly, the agent’s failure to anticipate this preference reversal, 
and indeed any preference reversals that follow, suggests that she is less than fully 
aware of the extent of her self-control problem(s) (Asheim, 2008:4). 
If  Akerlof’s  (1991:1)  differential salience  hypothesis  is  correct,  then  procrastination 
violates  both  assumptions  of  economic  rationality,  namely:  consistent  intertemporal 
decision-making and exploitation of full information when forming expectations of the 
future.  The first assumption is violated, almost by definition, when differential salience 
gives  rise  to  preference  reversals  which  reveal  dynamic-inconsistency  in  decision-
making.    Secondly, when agents repeatedly procrastinate because they (a) are not fully 
aware  of  their  self-control  problems  or  (b)  because  they  failed  to  learn  about  the 
dynamic inconsistency of their preferences when they procrastinated on former tasks, 
their expectations certainly are not formed rationally.  Instead, since these agents assign 
greater relative weight to earlier moments as they come closer than later moments, 
their  preferences  may  more  aptly  be  described  as  present-biased  (O’Donoghue  and 







3. Modelling Procrastination 
Both the cognitive psychology and experimental economics literatures have provided 
compelling evidence of the existence and pervasiveness of present-biased preferences.5  
Formal models of procrastination that have been developed in the economic literature 
have therefore included the modelling of  dynamic-inconsistency and present-biased 
preferences.6&7 However, while traditional economic intertemporal preference models 
have  been  able  to  capture  the  fact  that  agents  are  impatient  by  using  exponential 
discounting,  this  approach  explicitly  assumes  that  preferences  are  intertemporally 
consistent (O”Donoghue & Rabin, 1999:106).  Therefore, it is argued that intertemporal 
preferences  are  more  aptly  captured  by  hyperbolic  discounting  (Ainslie,  1974:485; 
Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989:192; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992:580).   
3.1.  Setting-up the model of Procrastination 
The vast majority of intertemporal preference models that investigate procrastination 
are  predicated  on  a  simplification  of  hyperbolic  discounting  called  quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting.8 Also referred to as  (β, δ) – preferences, this quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
approach not only captures the essence of present-biased preferences, but also largely 
preserves  exponential  discounting’s  analytical  tractability  (O’Dognohue  &  Rabin, 
1999:106; Fischer, 1999:8).   In discrete time, the basic (β, δ) – preferences model may 
be expressed as: 
                                  
 
     
                                                     
In  this  model,  as  in  the  traditional  exponential  discounting  model,  the  parameter  δ 
represents  the  time-consistent  long-run  discount  factor.    On  the  other  hand,  the 
                                                           
 
5 See, for example, Loewenstain and Prelec (1992), Gilovich, Kerr and Medvec (1993), Sasaki et al (2008), 
Bisin and Hyndman (2009), and Shu and Gneezy (2009). 
6 See,O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001 and 2006) and Fischer (1999). 
7 The exception to this rule is a paper by Carolyn Fischer (2001) in which procrastination is modelled 
with time-consistent preferences.  However, as Fischer herself notes in a follow -up paper: “...in this fully 
rational model, the implicit rate of time preference...needed to generate serious procrastination is much 
larger  than  is  typically  assigned  to  people  in  standard  economic  models.”  and  “...the  perception  that 
procrastination is problematic cannot be explained with time-consistent preferences.” (Fischer, 1999:3) 
8 This approach was first suggested by Phelps and Pollak (1968:186). 10 
 
 
parameter β captures the extent to which the future is discounted relative to the present 
or, put differently, the magnitude of the present-bias in preferences.  From the above it 
should  be  obvious  that  when  β  =  1  the  model  reduces  to  a  simple  exponential 
discounting model with time-consistent intertemporal preferences. However, when β < 
1, greater weight is assigned to the present relative to the future.  The β-parameter thus 
fully  captures  the  dynamic-inconsistency  suggested  by  present-biased  preferences. 
(O’Dognohue & Rabin, 1999:106) 
3.2.  Solving the model of Procrastination 
While  the  basic  (β,  δ)  –  preferences  model  presented  above  provides  a  basis  for 
analyzing the present-biased preferences that incentivise procrastination, it does not 
address the other key component needed to explain persistent procrastination - i.e. that 
procrastinating  agents  must,  in  some  form  or  other,  possess  less  than  full 
conscientiousness regarding their own self-control problems.  Yet, to assess the welfare 
implications  of  procrastination  it  is  necessary  to  incorporate  this  component  when 
modelling procrastination.  To  this  end, models  of procrastination  usually  employ  a 
picoeconomic approach whereby agents are divided diachronically into a sequence of 
interacting  selves  and  then  assumptions  are  made  regarding  their  levels  of 
conscientiousness (Ross, 2009:4).   Put more simply, the picoeconomic approach entails 
that  a  single  agent is  divided into  multiple  selves,  where  each  self  corresponds to  a 
specific time period.  The agent’s degree of conscientiousness can then be modelled by 
making assumptions regarding how accurately former selves anticipate the preferences 
of  later  selves.    The  agent  must  thus  choose  a  course  of  action  that  maximises  her 
current preferences conditional upon the fact that her future selves are effectively in 
control of her behaviour (O’Dognohune & Rabin, 1999:106).  
Previous models of procrastination in the economic literature have considered three 
generic levels of conscientiousness for agents with present-biased preferences.  Firstly, 
sophisticated agents or Sophisticates are fully aware of their future selves’ preferences 
and, therefore, of their future self-control problems (O’Dognohune & Rabin, 1999:106).  
Secondly, naïve agents or Naïfs believe that their future selves’ preferences will be fully 
consistent with their current preferences.  That is, they are wholly unaware of their 
future self-control problems (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2008:162). Lastly,  partially naïve 11 
 
 
agents or Partial Naïfs are aware that they may face self-control problems in the future, 
but  they  are  not  fully  aware  of  the  extent  of  these  self-control  problems  (Asheim, 
2008:4).9 
To determine  how much agents with present -biased preferences procrastinate, it is 
necessary to define a perception-perfect strategy for each level of  sophistication.  This 
perception-perfect  strategy  describes  an  agent’s  optimal  decision  path  given  both 
current  preferences,  and  the  perception  of  future  preferences  and  subsequent 
behaviour  (O’Dognohune  &  Rabin,  1999:106).  Given  these  perception-perfect 
strategies,  models  of  procrastination  may  then  be  solved  using  complicated  game-
theoretical modelling and backwards induction (O’Dognohune & Rabin, 2001; Asheim, 
2008). 
4. A New Model of Procrastination 
One of the shortcomings of the models of procrastination described in Section 3 above is 
the  categorical  classification  of  levels  of  sophistication.  In  these  models,  agents  are 
either  separated  into  two  extreme  categories,  Complete  Sophisticates  and  Complete 
Naifs, or, if they cannot accurately be described by either of these extremes, are placed 
into the single, imprecisely defined intermediate category of Partial Naïfs.   Evidence 
from the experimental economic literature on procrastination suggests, however, that 
procrastinators are neither fully sophisticated, nor fully naive.  Instead, it is found that 
agents exhibit, in mixed variations, elements of both sophistication and naivety when 
they  procrastinate  (Ariely  and  Wertenbroch,  2002:224;  DellaVigna  &  Malmendier, 
2006:20).   
These findings suggest that agents are generally aware that they will face self-control 
problems  when  they  procrastinate,  but  that  they  possess  varying  levels  of 
conscientiousness regarding the true extent of these self-control problems.  Accepting 
the validity of these findings, the single intermediate category of partial naivety, as it is 
                                                           
 
9Because sophistication and naivety represent  opposite ends on the scale of conscientiousness, in the 
remainder of this paper, they are respectively used as terms to refer to levels of conscientiousness which 
lie closer to that of Sophisticates and levels of conscientiousness which are closer to that of Naïfs 12 
 
 
defined  and  used  in  previous  models  of  procrastination,  can  no  longer  suffice  for 
modelling  procrastination  by  agents  who  are  neither  Complete  Sophisticates  nor 
Complete  Naifs.    The  aim  of  this  section,  therefore,  is  to  develop  a  new  model  of 
procrastination  wherein  an  agent’s  degree  of  sophistication  or  naivety  is  fully 
parameterised on a continuous scale.  This parameterisation allows one to gauge how 
marginal changes in an agent’s level of sophistication affect the extent of the agent’s 
procrastinating behaviour and its subsequent implications for personal welfare.   
4.1.  Some Preliminaries 
This  section  specifically  considers  procrastination  on  a  multiple-stage,  divisible  task 
with  a  deadline.    The  performance  of  this  task  requires  repeated  input(s)  of  effort 
and/or time which yield disutility at the point where effort and/or time is expended.10  
In other words, the costs of performing the task are experienced immediately.  The task 
also produces a reward, the size of which depends  directly on the agent’s cumulative 
inputs into the performance of the task.   However, this reward is only received if the 
task is completed and then only after the task-deadline.  While the reward thus yields 
utility,  this  utility  is  only  experienced  after  the  task-deadline.    In  other  words,  the 
reward from performing the task is delayed.     
The features described above are characteristic of a typical academic research-paper 
which a student is assigned to complete for grading before a certain deadline.  This 
example is therefore often used throughout the following two sections to simplify and 
facilitate the discussion on the development of the new model of procrastination.11  The 
aim in the development of this model is to keep its assumptions and dynamics as close 
to reality as possible while maintaining sufficient tractability for its results to be readily 
interpretable.   
 
 
                                                           
 
10 I.e. labour is assumed to be aversive. 
11 It is important to note, however, that the results from this model may be generalised to any other tasks 
or actions that are characterised by the same features as the research paper.  13 
 
 
4.2.  Model Setup: Rewards, Costs and Constraints  
Suppose a representative agent called Sarah, is given on day         a task to perform 
over a total of   days.   If Sarah performs the task before the deadline, she will receive a 
reward in time   , where      . The value of this reward,  , is an increasing function of 
the cumulative number of hours that Sarah works on the task over the   days before the 
deadline. 12  That is: 
         
 
   
                                     
where    is the number of hours that Sarah works on the task on day  t and       is 
strictly increasing and concave.   
Based  on  various  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  variables,  including  Sarah’s  intellectual 
capacity, her personal ambitions, the time constraint that she faces and her supervisor’s 
expectations,  Sarah  sets  her  own,  subjective  predetermined  “goal”  reward,   .13 Of 
course, in order for Sarah to obtain this  “goal”  reward,  she  will  need  to  work  the 
number of hours that will set       .  Suppose that the true total number of hours that 
Sarah would need to work in order to obtain    is equal to   such that          .  Also 
assume,  for  now,  that,  in  the  absence  of  any  uncertainty,  Sarah  is  able  to  correctly 
estimate the value of  .14  
Sarah  realizes  that  she  needs  to  work      
 
        hours  in  order  to  receive     .  
However, because it is assumed that labour causes disutility, Sarah also realizes that her 
labour will incur a cost,  , which is an increasing function of the cumulative number of 
hours that she works on the task over the   days before the deadline.  Specifically:  
          
 
   
                                     
                                                           
 
12 Unfortunately, since effort cannot be readily measured, it has to be assumed for simplicity that the 
number of hours worked on the task fully captures the amount of effort and/or time that agents put into 
the performance of the task. 
13 If the task involves the writing of a research paper, for example, Sarah’s goal value for her reward may, 
for instance, be to get an A grade for her paper. 
14 The implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed in Section 5.2 below. 14 
 
 
where      is strictly increasing and convex.15  Therefore, if Sarah works   hours, her 
labour will not only yield her desired reward,   , but will also incur a cost of         .  
However, for Sarah, this specific end justifies the means.  This is so, by definition, since 
Sarah  otherwise  would  not  have  chosen          .16   Put differently,  for  Sarah  the 
value of the goal reward is at least enough to offset the costs of the labour performed in 
order to receive the goal reward.  Formally: 
                           
Since Sarah determines her own subjective goal reward, she would not be happy if she 
received a reward which is less than   , even if it implied that she would then need to 
work  fewer  than  R  hours  and,  therefore,  expend  less  “effort”  in  order  to  obtain  a 
reward.  That is: 
                                                         
Given Sarah’s reward-cost preferences above, she must now decide how to structure the 
  hours of work on the task over the   days available to her.  She is aware that the daily 
extraction rate of labour is ultimately constrained by length of the day and that, if she 
faced no other constraints, such as the need to sleep and eat, she would technically be 
able to work a maximum of 24 hours each day (Fischer, 1999:7).  Of course, since she 
may well face other constraints on her time, this does not mean that she will be able to 
work 24 hours a day, but merely imposes two additional binding constraints on her 
behaviour: 
                    
   
 
   
     
 
   
      
where    is the total number of hours available for work on the task on day   
                                                           
 
15 Herweg and Müller (2008:6) explain the reason for the convexity of this cost function by asserting that 
“...the costs of effort are the opportunity costs of not enjoying leisure time. Making the standard assumption 
of decreasing marginal utility of leisure time is equivalent to assuming a convex cost function.” 
16 I.e., the agent chooses the goal reward that maximises subjective utility conditional on the amount of 
input needed to yield that reward. 15 
 
 
4.3.  Model Setup: Adding Intertemporal Preferences  
The  previous section  depicts  the  preferences and constraints  that agents face when 
assigned  with  the  type  of  task  described  in  Section  4.1.    However,  to  model 
procrastination it is necessary to know how agents will structure their work on the task 
over the time available to them.  To know the structure of agents’ work, it is necessary 
to take cognisance of their intertemporal preferences.    
From  the  discussion  of  differential  salience  in  Section  2.3  and  present-biased 
preferences in Section 3, it is clear that  a model of procrastination must be able to 
account for (β, δ) – preferences.  Furthermore, Fischer (1999:15) argues that differential 
salience may not only manifest temporally, but also spatially.  That is, in addition to 
assigning greater weight to a present event relative to that same event in the future, 
agents may also assign greater weight to one type of event relative to another type of 
event even if they occur at the same time.  The essence of this principle is illustrated by 
the concept of loss aversion according to which agents assign more weight to losses 
than to proportional gains (Schmidt and Zank, 2005:157).  Thus, it may be the case that, 
in present-biased preferences, the weight assigned to present relative to future costs is 
not the same as the weight assigned to present relative to future rewards. 
Given the features described above, the basic model of intertemporal-preferences with 
which procrastination can be analyzed may be expressed as follows.  F             : 
                             
 
   
                         
 
     
 
      
     
              
      
     
    
                                                                                                     
Here, δ once again represents the time-consistent long-run discount factor for costs and 
rewards whereas   and β respectively capture the salience of future relative to present 
rewards and the salience of present relative to future costs.   The use of two distinct 
parameters to capture the differential temporal salience of costs and rewards means 
that one can also capture the salience of rewards relative to costs.  When the rewards of 16 
 
 
certain tasks are not clearly defined, for instance, it may be the case that, even after 
controlling for the timing-structure of costs and rewards, the costs of the task remains 
more salient than its rewards.  In such an event the parameter    would be less than  .   
4.4.  Model Setup: Adding Conscientiousness  
Up to this point, agents’ levels of conscientiousness have not yet entered the model of 
procrastination.    To  introduce  this  key  component,  it  is  first  necessary  to  carefully 
consider what conscientiousness implies.  An example of real world behaviour put forth 
by Ariely and Werntenbroch (2002:219) serves to illuminate this issue: 
“...well in advance of actually taking on the responsibility of writing a book, the 
benefits  of  completing  such  a  task  loom  large,  and  the  costs  seem  small. 
Consequently, authors take on such tasks. But as the deadline draws closer, the 
saliency  of  the  costs  and  benefits  changes.    Authors  become  increasingly 
aware of the costs (the time needed for completing the task), while the benefits 
become increasingly less clear.” [emphasis added] 
What Ariely and Werntenbroch (2002:219) describe here is an evolutionary process.  
Firstly, they point out the fact that preferences and the saliency of certain events are not 
stationary.  Rather, they change with the passage of time. Secondly, the authors point to 
the  fact  that  this  change  takes  place  as  a  result  of  agents’  awareness  of  costs  and 
rewards.  To  illuminate  these  points  further,  consider  what  happens  when  agents 
procrastinate on a task with a deadline. Agents cannot procrastinate forever.  Sooner or 
later,  they  must  make  a  decision  to  work  on  the  task,  or  not  at  all.    When  agents 
postpone working on a task only to commence work closer to the deadline, this reveals 
the  fact  that  the  component  of  their  preferences  that  initially  incentivised 
procrastination is no longer operating as strongly.17  Put differently, individuals stop 
procrastinating when the salience of the present relative to the future dwindles as the 
deadline approaches. 
                                                           
 
17 This principle also applies when agents may already do some work on a task close to the assignment 
date, but leave the majority of the total workload until closer to the deadline. 17 
 
 
This  line  of  reasoning  answers  the  question  as  to  why  procrastinators  would  stop 
procrastinating as  the  task-deadline approaches.  However,  it  does  not  explain  why 
certain agents stop procrastinating before others do.  It is the contention of this paper 
that agents’ levels of conscientiousness regarding their own self-control problems and 
the nature and requirements of the tasks they face determine the speed with which 
their present-biased preferences evolve into time-consistent preferences as the task-
deadline approaches.  Specifically, within the context of a divisible task with immediate 
costs and delayed rewards such as described in Section 4.1, it is argued that an agent’s 
level of conscientiousness determines how fast future costs become as salient as present 
costs.  Using the model presented in Section 4.2 above, this implies that, ceteris paribus, 
the greater an agent’s conscientiousness, the faster   converges to 1.18  In the model of 
intertemporal preferences, an agent’s level of conscientiousness is thus parameterised as 
follows: 
                             
 
   
                          
 
     
 
            
 
      
            
          
   
           
 




                                                               
   
                   
   
      
  
  
       
  
  
      
  
  
      
  
  
     
  
  
     
  
  
    
  
     
   
   
     
  
      
 
         
       
  
  
         
  
  
       
  
  
        
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
     
   
   
        
  
      
 
         
       
                                                           
 




In  this  model,  the  α-parameter  captures  an  agent’s  level  of  conscientiousness  or 
sophistication.19  However, it is important to note that the way  sophistication is defined 
here  differs  somewhat  from  other  studies  of  procrastination.    In  other  studies,  the 
greater an agent’s level of sophistication, the more aware that agent is of her own future 
self-control problems.  However, if the agent is sufficiently aware that her self-control 
problems  in  the  future  may  restrain  her  ability  to  satisfy  her  own  subjective 
predetermined goal(s), she will have an incentive to do something about it.  In fact, she 
will  have  an  incentive  to  adjust  the  expectations  of  her  own  future  behaviour, 
conditional  on  the  changes  in  her  task  characteristics,  such  that  her  self-control 
problems may be overcome before they become a serious threat to her predetermined 
goal(s).    Put  differently,  an  agent’s  sophistication  determines  her  awareness  of,  and 
sensitivity  to,  her  present-biased  preferences,  the  speed  at  which  the  task  deadline 
approaches, and the size of the workload she faces relative to the time that she has 
available for the performance of the task.  The greater her level of sophistication, the 
greater her response will be to changes in these variables, and the faster she will adjust 









                                                           
 
19 The           term in the equation for X is included solely for the purpose of avoiding division by zero.  
The choice of this specific magnitude is somewhat arbitrary, since any negligibly small number would 
serve the same purpose without materially affecting the equation’s results.   





























       
       








Figure 1 - Sophistication and speed of convergence of β 19 
 
 
Figure 1 above illustrates that agents with values of α closer to 0 are more sophisticated 
than agents with values of α closer to 1 and that the rate at which   converges to 1 is 
faster the more sophisticated an agent is.  The model is also specified such that the 
convergence  of   to  1  quickens  as  the  agent  approaches  the  deadline,  is  slower  the 
greater the amount of time that the agent has available to perform the task, is faster the 
greater the size of the workload and the salience of the task reward, and is slower the 
greater the amount of the workload that the agent has already completed.  This makes 
intuitive sense since the size of the remaining workload,          
   
     , relative to the 
amount  of  time  available  to  perform  the  task,  ,  becomes  more  pressing  as      .  
However, as mentioned above, the speed of the response to changes in these variables 
and thus the speed of convergence depend on the agent’s level of conscientiousness. 
4.5.  Model Setup: The Perception-based strategy  
Given the setup of the model of procrastination above, a perception-based strategy for all 
agents can now be defined.  Note that, unlike the perception-perfect strategy described 
in Section 3.2 above, the perception-based strategy does not necessarily describe the 
optimal  decision  path  of  the  agent.      Instead,  the  perception-based  strategy  simply 
describes how an agent chooses to structure work between the present and the future, 
based on present preferences and present perceptions of future preferences.20 
Assume that in each period an agent can decide whether or not to work on the task.    
However, the agent will only work on the task on a given day if the total utility from 
working on that day is at least as great as the expected total utility from performing the 
same amount of work on any day thereafter.21  Put slightly differently, to the question of 
whether or not an agent wishes to work on any given day, she can answer either “yes” or 
“no”.   If she decides “yes”, then it is assumed that she will either work the total number 
of hours that is available for work on that day,   , or if       ,, she will work the total 
number of hours needed to attain her goal reward.  Using the language of O’Donoghue 
and Rabin (1999:108), a perception-based strategy can now be defined: 
                                                           
 
20 In other words, the perception-based strategy may well lead agents to make decisions that are sub-
optimal from the perspective of total subjective utility. 




The perception-based strategy for all agents is a strategy                  
that satisfies for all              if and only if                 for all       
and          
To illustrate how this perception-based strategy works, consider three distinct agents. 
Agent 1 has time-consistent preferences such that      .  For this agent, the level of 
sophistication  is  thus  irrelevant.    Both  Agent  2  and  Agent  3  have  present-biased 
preferences such that        .  However, while Agent 2 is a Perfect Sophisticate with 
     ,  Agent  3  is  a  Perfect Naïf  with      .  For  simplicity,  assume  that       and 
             for all      .  Furthermore, assume that       and      .22 
Agent 1 faces the following intertemporal preference choice structure: 
                            
                           
 
                                 
                             
                      
The result above shows that Agent 1 is completely indifferent between doing the task on 
day 1, day 2, or day 3.  However, since Agent 1 has no incentive to procrastinate, as per 
the perception-based strategy, she chooses to perform the task on day 1 such that her 
total utility is given by: 
                          
Agent 2 faces the following intertemporal preference structure: 
                            
                           
 
                                                      
                                                      
                      
                                                           
 
22 O’Donoghue  and  Rabin  (1999:107)  note  that  the  assumption  that         may  be  made  purely  for 
convenient simplicity as it does not affect the results from the model. 21 
 
 
The  result  above  shows  that,  because  Agent  2  is  perfectly  sophisticated,  his 
conscientiousness completely neutralises his present-biased preferences such that, given 
his perception-based strategy, he has no incentive to procrastinate. Therefore, Agent 2 
effectively behaves exactly like an agent with time-consistent preferences, performing 
the task on day 1 and receiving total utility: 
                          
Finally, Agent 3 faces the following intertemporal preference structure: 
 
                            
                                                                                        
                                                            
   
                                            
                                                            
   
                         
                  
                         
                      
The analysis above differs quite markedly from the cases for Agent 1 and Agent 2. On 
day 1, Agent 3’s complete naivety and her present-biased preferences lead her to expect 
that she will be better off if she works on the task either on day 2 or day 3 rather than 
on day 1.  Therefore, she procrastinates on day 1.  On day 2 however, she expects to be 
better off if she works on the task on day 3 rather than day 2, so she also procrastinates 
on day 2.  On day 3, Agent 3 faces a new problem.  She is aware that, even if she worked 
on the task on day 4, she would get no reward since it would then already be past the 
task  deadline.  However,  since  the  reward  incentivises  the  input  of  labour  into  the 
performance of the task, she would therefore also not be willing to perform any work on 
the task on day 4.  As a result, Agent 3 chooses to work on the task on day 3 for which 
she receives utility: 22 
 
 
                          
A couple of important results flow from the analysis above.  Firstly, Perfect Sophisticates 
with  present-biased  preferences  will  always  behave  as  if  they  had  time-consistent 
preferences.  That is, they will have no incentive to procrastinate and will subsequently 
maximise  their  own  subjective  utility.    Secondly,  Perfect  Naïfs  with  present-biased 
preferences will always have an incentive to procrastinate at least until time      .  In 
the  example  above,  Agent  3  was  able  to  procrastinate  until  the  last  day  and  still 
maximise her own subjective utility as per lemma 1.  However, it should be clear that 
this would not have been the case if        for all      .  Under these circumstances, 
procrastinating  until  day  3  would  have  meant  that  Agent  3  would  not  be  able  to 
complete   hours of work before the deadline and, consequently, that she would only be 
able to receive a reward equal to                  .  According to lemma 2, Agent 3’s 
procrastination  would  then  have  lead  to  a  loss  relative  to  her  maximum  subjective 
utility: 
                                                 
This finding characterises the third and perhaps most important result from this model:  
Procrastination leads to the non-maximisation of total subjective utility when it causes 
agents  to  perform  too  little  work  on  a  task  to  achieve  their  own,  subjective, 
predetermine goals.  This result is illustrated more clearly in the next section. 
5. Welfare Implications of Procrastination: Illustrative Examples 
 
This  section  employs  the  model  of  procrastination  developed  above  to  analyse  two 
illustrative examples of the welfare implications of procrastination for different levels of 
conscientiousness.  To this end, recall the representative agent, Sarah, from Section 4.1 
above.  Suppose that Sarah is one of three triplets.  Sarah and her two brothers, Dev and 
Don, are all three enrolled in a postgraduate Microeconomics course at University.  As 
partial  fulfilment  of  the  course’s  requirements,  all  students  have  to  write  a  short 
academic paper on behavioural economics.  Their lecturer has given them 10 days to 
complete and hand in this assignment for grading.  For the purposes of simplification, 
assume that the lecturer grades papers according to the amount of time that students 23 
 
 
put into writing them and that the students are aware of the lecturer’s specific approach 
to grading papers.   
 
Assume that the triplets are identical in every conceivable way, save for their levels of 
conscientiousness.    Sarah  is  partially sophisticated  and  has  an   equal  to  0.5.    Dev  is 
slightly more conscientious than Sarah such that his   is equal to 0.4.  Don is the least 
conscientious with an   equal to 0.6.  The triplets are accustomed to doing quite well 
academically and would ideally each like to receive score of 80 out of a possible 100 for 
their academic papers.  To do so in reality, they would each need to work 40 hours in 
total before the deadline.  However, the triplets all have present-biased preferences and 
therefore have at least some incentive to procrastinate.  Assume that their  s are all 
equal to 0.5.  Finally, as in Section4, assume for simplicity that          . 
5.1.  Case 1: No Uncertainty 
Assume that the triplets correctly anticipate that they will need to work               
   
  hours in order to receive their goal reward               .  Furthermore, assume 
that, because of various other constraints on their time during the 10 days, they will 
only be able to work on the paper for a maximum of 8 hours each day.  That is,         
for all       such that             
    .  Lastly, assume that the triplets not only know that 
they have 80 hours in total to do the work they need to do, but also that they have only 
8 hours available each day. 
To determine how they should structure their labour over the course of the 10 days, the 
triplets each follow their own perception-based strategy.  The effective present-biased 






                                                           
 
23 As an example of how the model functions, the calculation of Sarah’s effective present-bias discount 
factors is shown in the appendix. 24 
 
 
Figure 2 - Sarah, Dev, and Don's effective present-biased discount factors without uncertainty 
 
 
To  calculate  the  triplets’  respective  intertemporal-preference  structures,  it  is  first 
necessary to define a threshold            above which agents will become indifferent 
between working on day   and day       for all      .24  It should be evident that this  
threshold            is  not  only  necessary  for  the  model  to  yield  predictions  of 
behaviour,  but  also  that  it  critically  influences  the  nature  of  those  predictions.  
Unfortunately, in the absence of any empirical estimates regarding agents’ sensitivities 
to  temporal  saliency  differences,  the  choice  of  this  threshold  value  is  somewhat 
idiosyncratic  and  is  anchored  only  by  notion  that  agents  will  work  “…if and only if 
               …” as stated in Section 4.5 above. 25 For the purpose of this paper, the 
threshold is assumed to be                  .  Given this threshold, Sarah, Dev, and Don’s 
intertemporal labour decision structures can be estimated as in Table 1 below.  
                                                           
 
24 Of course, on day      , agents will likely not be indifferent between working on day   and on day 
     , since working on day       no longer brings any reward.  Instead, agents would prefer to work on 
day    and receive reward         if    is sufficiently large to offset the cost of labour performed to obtain 
it.   
25 The problem here is that one cannot definitively state when            may be regarded as equivalent to 
1.  One could assume that the true threshold            would lie closer to 1 for agents who are more 
sensitive to saliency differences than for agents who are less sensitive to such differences.  However, in 
the absence of any definitive knowledge regarding agents’ levels of sensitivity, it may be prudent to 






















































Dev (α=0.4) Sarah (α=0.5) Don (α=0.6)25 
 
 
Table 1 - Sarah, Dev, and Don's intertemporal labour decision structures without uncertainty 
 
 
Consider  first  the  case  of  Sarah  whose  perception-based  strategy  is  given  as: 
                              .  Sarah thus procrastinates for the first four days, 
but during the remainder of the time before the deadline, she works eight hours a day 
for five days.  In total, therefore, Sarah works the 40 hours necessary to achieve the 
grade that she aimed for.  As a result, despite procrastinating, Sarah maximises her own 
total subjective utility as per lemma 1: 
                     
Now  consider  Dev’s  perception-based  strategy:                               .   
Since  Dev  is  more  conscientious  than  Sarah,  he  procrastinates  one  day  less  before 
starting work on his paper.  As a result, Dev finishes his paper one day before Sarah 
finishes hers and also maximises his own total subjective utility: 
                   
Finally, Don’s perception-based strategy is given as:                             .  
Don  procrastinates  two  days  longer  than  Sarah,  and  3  days  longer  than  Dev.  
Unfortunately, because Don procrastinates for so long, he is only able to work on the 
paper during the last four days before the deadline.  In other words, Don realises too 
late that his procrastinating behaviour will impede his ability to complete the task as he 
initially intended.  As a result, he can only do 32 hours of work in total, not the 40 hours 
which he would have preferred.  According to lemma 2 this implies that Don suffers a 
loss relative to his optimal total subjective utility: 
                                   
 
This  example  illustrates  how  agents’  levels  of  conscientiousness  may  impact  on  the 
extent to which they procrastinate.  From the results above, it appears as though agents 
  Day (t)  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Total 













  Dev            -  -  -  8  8  8  8  8  -  -  40 
Sarah            -  -  -  -  8  8  8  8  8  -  40 
Don            -  -  -  -  -  -  8  8  8  8  32 26 
 
 
who are sufficiently sophisticated may be able to perform a task as satisfactorily (with 
no loss of personal welfare) as agents who do not procrastinate at all.  Similarly, the 
more naive agents are, the more it seems they will be unable to overcome their self-
control problems such that the impact of their procrastination on their personal welfare 
could indeed be negative.  However, in this example it was assumed that the agents 
under consideration were capable of correctly anticipating the number of hours that 
they would have to work in total to achieve their goals and that they knew not only how 
many hours they had available to do this work, but also how these hours were spread 
across time.  The example in the next section relaxes these assumptions to see how 
uncertainty affects the extent and welfare implications of procrastination. 
5.2.  Case 2: Facing Uncertainty 
Suppose that, instead of the triplets correctly estimating the amount of time they would 
have to work on the paper to get 80 out of 100, they underestimate the value of   to be 
equal to 30 hours.26  Also suppose that the triplets believe that they have a total of 100 
hours over the 10 days in which to complete the task.   Furthermore, assume that they 
are unaware that, in reality, the 80 hours available to them are spread randomly across 
the 10 days such that:                                                                
                   .  Finally, assume that the triplets will only gain knowledge of the 
true values of        and             
     once they begin work on their papers.  All other 
details  remain  as  in  Section  5.1  above.    The  new  effective  present-biased  discount 
factors and intertemporal labour decision structures are shown in Figure 3 and Table 2 







                                                           
 
26 This could happen if the triplets were under the impression that they knew quite a lot about behaviour 
economics and, subsequently, that it would not take them that long to write a really good paper on it. 27 
 
 
Figure 3- Sarah, Dev, and Don's effective present-biased discount factors with uncertainty 
 
Table 2 - Sarah, Dev, and Don's intertemporal labour decision structures with uncertainty 
 
 
Sarah’s  new  perception-based  strategy  is:                               .    The 
change  in  Sarah’s  strategy  relative  to  her  strategy  in  Section  5.1  comes  from  two 
sources.    Firstly,  Sarah  underestimates  the  amount  of  work  (time)  it  will  take  to 
complete her paper in a satisfactory manner and overestimates the time at her disposal 
to do so, causing her to procrastinate another day.  Secondly, even though she updates 
her expectations to the correct values of   and     
  
     once she starts working on the 
task, the fact that she could not foresee how the available time was structured over the 
remaining days means that she can only complete a total of 38 hours work before the 






















































Dev (α=0.4) Sarah (α=0.5) Don (α=0.6)
  Day (t)  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Total 













  Dev            -  -  -  -  3  5  8  5  7  12  40 
Sarah            -  -  -  -  -  5  8  5  7  13  38 
Don            -  -  -  -  -  -  -  5  7  13  25 28 
 
 
when she did not face uncertainty as in Section 5.1, the uncertainty here resulted in her 
procrastination causing a direct loss of personal welfare: 
                                     
 
Dev’s  perception-based  strategy  under  uncertainty  is  given  by: 
                            .    The  same  factors  that  influenced  the  changes  in 
Sarah’s strategy between certainty and uncertainty are also responsible for changing 
Dev’s perception-based strategy.  While Dev procrastinated only one more day under 
uncertainty than under certainty, the structure of the remaining available labour time 
meant that he only just finished his paper (i.e. a total of 40 hours of work) on the day 
before the deadline instead of two days before the deadline.  However, Dev’s level of 
conscientiousness was sufficient to counteract any negative implications that uncertainty 
(in this example) may have had for his personal welfare and he was therefore still able 
to maximise his total subjective utility: 
                   
 
Don,  the  least  sophisticated  of  the  triplets,  procrastinated  one  day  longer  when  he 
possessed uncertain knowledge regarding the task characteristics, as is shown by his 
perception-based  strategy:                               .    As  a  result,  his 
procrastination resulted in an even greater loss of welfare than it had when there was 
no uncertainty: 
                                                   
 
The findings from this example illustrate that increased uncertainty regarding the true 
values of the task parameters increases the likelihood that agents will procrastinate 
more severely, that such procrastination will result in a loss of personal welfare, and 
that the extent of this welfare loss will be greater than under certainty.   However, it is 
also  clear  that  less conscientious  agents  are  much  more  susceptible  to  the  negative 






6. The New Model of Procrastination: Some Limitations 
The model presented in Section 4 and illustrated in Section 5  above provides some 
insights into the theoretical role that present-biased preferences and conscientiousness 
play in informing procrastinating behaviour.  However, its cumbersome functional form 
and its dependency on, and sensitivity to, subjective judgements of threshold levels of 
saliency  impede  its  analytic  tractability.    Moreover,  there  are  several  aspects 
surrounding procrastination that it fails to address.  The first and foremost of these is 
the fact that the amount of time spent on the performance of a task is not necessarily 
the same as the amount of effort put into its performance.  Not only do different agents 
possess different productive capacities, but agents may also be more productive under 
certain circumstances than others.  In fact, it is commonly held that some agents are 
more productive under pressure, while others are more productive when they have 
ample time in which to perform a task.  For certain agents, procrastination may thus 
actually be beneficial if it implies that less time has to be spent on the performance of a 
task  when  that  task  is  performed  closer  to  the  deadline.  (Tice  and  Baumeister, 
1997:455)  
The illustration of the model in Section 5 also ignores the importance that the saliency 
of  rewards  plays  in  incentivising  procrastination.    When  the  nature  and  timing  of 
rewards are clearly defined, agents have a clear goal to work towards.  In a sense, the 
clarity  with  which  rewards  are  defined  reduces  uncertainty  surrounding  task 
characteristics  and  requirements,  thereby  reducing  the  incentive  to  procrastinate 
(Fischer, 2001:256).  By contrast, when rewards and the timing thereof are vaguely 
defined, they may be unduly discounted, making the present costs even more salient in 
relation to the rewards.  This is often the case with academic procrastination.  Students 
may, for example, not always know precisely what the reward from writing an academic 
paper is supposed to be.  Is it the grade to be obtained for the paper; is it the knowledge 
obtained from writing the paper; or is it the fact that, by completing the paper, students 
regain the time to do the things that they actually want to do?   In the absence of clear 
answers to such questions, agents may discount the value of rewards more heavily than 
the costs incurred to attain them. 30 
 
 
Another factor not addressed in the model is that serious procrastination, to the extent 
that  it  renders  an  agent  unable  to  satisfactorily  perform  a  task,  may  lead  to  the 
imposition  of  serious  penalties.    Consider,  for  example,  an  agent  employed  at  an 
investment management firm who is assigned a certain high-priority task.  Satisfactory 
completion  of  the  task  may  bring  the  reward  of  a  job-promotion.    However, 
unsatisfactory completion of the task as a result of too much procrastination may not 
only mean that the agent does not receive this promotion, but that, instead, the agent is 
actually demoted.  In this sense, rewards and penalties operate as the carrots and sticks 
that provide the incentive to perform a task in a timely manner. (Fischer, 2001:260) 
The model in Section 4 implicitly assumes that procrastinating individuals will always 
have an incentive to begin work on the task no later than on the day before the deadline. 
However, within the context of the rewards and penalties of a task, it is conceivable that 
serious procrastination may increase the risk of abandoning the performance of a task 
altogether.  That is, for many agents, there is likely to be some threshold level of input, 
below which the rewards they will receive in exchange for the performance of a task no 
longer justifies the costs they have to incur to perform it.  Similarly, if the penalties 
expected from performing less than this threshold level of input are trivially different 
from the penalties expected from not doing any work, the agent may have an incentive 
to abandon the task.  (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2008:162) 
Thus far, it has been assumed that the time available for the performance of a task is 
structured in a fixed manner across the number of days before the task-deadline.  In 
reality, however, agents may restructure this available time as they choose.27  When 
procrastinating agents realise close to the deadline that they cannot possibly finish the 
task satisfactorily given the constraints imposed on their time by other responsibilities, 
they may abandon some of these other responsibili ties in an attempt to increase the 
time they have available for the performance of  the task. However, it is quite possible 
that such tradeoffs may be costly to an agent.   Specifically, while this paper considered 
task procrastination somewhat in isolation by arguing that procrastinating behaviour 
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only results in a loss of welfare if it impedes the satisfactory completion of the task 
being procrastinated on, procrastination on one task may also impede the satisfactory 
completion of other tasks which compete for the agent’s time.  Thus, if agents respond 
to procrastination by re-allocating time between competing tasks near the deadline, it is 
quite  possible  that,  by  shifting  the  costs  of  task  performance,  their  procrastinating 
behaviour  would  result  in  losses  to  personal  welfare  similar  to,  albeit  for  different 
reasons, than what is suggested in Sections 4 and 5.  
Finally, the analysis in this paper disregards any adverse effects that procrastination 
may  have  on  the  emotional  or  physical  wellbeing  of  the  procrastinating  individual.  
However,  evidence  from  the  psychological  literature  shows  that  procrastinating 
behaviour is often associated with considerable feelings of regret, anxiety or dejection 
(Tice and Baumeister, 1997:454).  In turn, the stress brought about by procrastination 
may not only impede the performance of the task in question, but may in some case 
even have detrimental impacts on an agent’s health (Tice and Baumeister, 1997:457).  
Therefore,  to  accurately  determine  the  welfare  implications  of  procrastination  it 
becomes  necessary to look at  the  extent to which procrastinating behaviour is  self-
defeating not only in terms of impeding an agent’s ability to satisfactorily complete a 
task, but also in terms of reducing an agent’s physical and emotional wellbeing.   
7. Conclusion 
Procrastinating behaviour is a phenomenon that manifests in practically all aspects of 
human  endeavour.      Despite  its  pervasiveness,  however,  surprisingly  little  is  still 
understood about the implications that it may have for both personal and social welfare.  
In this paper, an attempt was made to provide an overview of procrastination, its causes 
and consequences, and its relevance to the field of economics.  Given the evidence from 
both the psychological and economic literatures, it is clear that procrastination can best 
be explained as a result of present-biased preferences which are formed in response to 
the differential saliency (from both a temporal and spatial perspective) of costs relative 
to  rewards.    In  this  context  this  paper  has  argued  that,  although  the  underlying 
preferences that incentivise procrastination are dynamically inconsistent and therefore 
irrational, procrastination is a rational response to these present-biased preferences.  32 
 
 
One of the shortcomings of previous models of intertemporal preferences that have 
been used to analyse procrastination is that they fail to explain how marginal changes in 
an  agent’s  degree  of  conscientiousness  regarding  personal  expected  self-control 
problems  and  the  nature  and  requirements  of  tasks  influence  the  extent  of 
procrastinating  behaviour  and,  consequently,  influence  the  welfare  implications  of 
procrastination.  The new model proposed in this paper therefore parameterises an 
agent’s degree of  sophistication  as  an evolutionary process that  transforms  present-
biased preferences into time-consistent preferences as the task deadline approaches.   
The results from this model show that, for divisible tasks with immediate costs and 
delayed rewards, more sophisticated agents have an incentive to procrastinate less than 
their more naive counterparts.  As a result, procrastination results in greater losses to 
personal subjective utility when agents are less conscientious.  This effect is exacerbated 
when there is a larger degree of uncertainty regarding the nature and requirements of 
the task with which an agent is faced.  However since the model ignores many of the 
subtleties related to real-world procrastinating behaviour, as discussed in Section 6, 
there  are  several  reasons  to  believe  that  it  may  still  underestimate  the  negative 
implications of procrastination on personal welfare.   
The theoretical assertion that procrastination is costly to personal welfare is consistent 
with the findings of other behavioural models of procrastination and the experimental 
economic literature.28  Acknowledging these potential costs of procrastination, it now 
becomes important to understand the extent to which individuals are  conscientious in 
reality.  Since there is evidence to suggest that the majority of chronic procrastinators 
exhibit greater naivety than sophistication, further research should examine how self-
imposed and externally imposed self-control mechanisms, such as pre-commitment to 
intermediate  deadlines  or  continuous  assessment,  can  increase  agents’  levels  of 
conscientiousness  and  subsequently  reduce  procrastinating  behaviour.  (Ariely  and 
Werntenbroch, 2002:224) 
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Calculation of Sarah’s effective present-bias discount factors: 
Time  Effective present-bias discount factor 
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